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Abstract 
This paper examines the informal division of labour in the EU’s external 
environmental policy-making. In EU policy-making with regard to the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and international climate 
negotiations, member states and the Commission informally ‘take the lead’ on a 
particular issue under the authority of the Presidency. In the case of the CSD, 
‘lead countries’ play an important role in the preparation of the EU’s position, 
whereas the EU’s representation in day-to-day climate negotiations is carried out 
by ‘lead negotiators’, who are assisted by ‘issue leaders’, who in their turn link the 
EU’s representation system with its decision-making structure. In spite of the 
increasing importance and relevance of that phenomenon for the EU’s external 
environmental policy-making, it has not yet been thoroughly studied. Based on 
interviews with officials from the member states, the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat and on non-participatory observation, this paper aims to make 
a first contribution to filling that gap. Therefore, it addresses the following 
questions: why do actors in the EU opt for that system of informal division of 
labour?; how does that system function in practice in the CSD and climate change 
contexts?; what are the opportunities and caveats it possibly generates?; and 
finally, what can we learn from it about the EU’s external environmental policy-
making? 
Keywords 
climate negotiations; Commission on Sustainable Development; European Union; 
informal division of labour; lead countries, issue leaders & lead negotiators 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to gain deeper insights in the informal division of labour in the 
European Union’s (EU) external environmental policy-making. In a couple of 
international environmental negotiations, such as in the CSD (United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable Development) or in climate negotiations in the 
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) context, 
we observe that the Presidency, who is formally in charge of leading the Council’s 
decision-making and the EU’s representation, informally assigns some of its tasks 
to interested member states or the Commission.1 Indeed, non-Presidency actors 
are able to ‘take the lead’ in the EU’s external environmental policy-making. In 
the context of the EU’s decision-making with regard to CSD negotiations, ‘lead 
countries’ take an important role in the preparation of the EU’s position, whereas 
the EU’s representation in day-to-day climate negotiations is carried out by ‘lead 
negotiators’, who are assisted by ‘issue leaders’, who in their turn link the EU’s 
representation system with its decision-making structure. 
 
The cases analyzed in this paper – namely the informal division of labour in the 
EU in the context of international negotiations on CSD and climate change – are 
characterized by four common features. First, it is an informal system, which is 
not driven by Treaty provisions or other (legal) obligations. It takes place under 
the formal authority of the Presidency and the various actors who take the lead 
perform their task under the Presidency’s umbrella. Although in theory, each 
Presidency has the right and the opportunity to abandon that system and to take 
up all the work on its own, we notice that successive Presidencies opt to continue 
working along those informal lines. Second, two different kinds of tasks are 
informally divided among member states or Commission officials who take the 
lead. On the one hand, in the pre-negotiation stage, the preparation of EU 
positions is largely steered by lead countries (in the CSD case) or by issue leaders 
(in the climate case). On the other hand, in the actual negotiation stage of 
climate change negotiations, the representation of the EU is taken up by lead 
negotiators. Indeed, whereas the preparation of EU positions is a task informally 
divided in both cases, the representation of the EU is informally assigned to lead 
negotiators only in the context of the climate change negotiations. Third, the 
actors taking the lead are informally assigned a particular task because of specific 
                                                
1 Although sustainable development is a horizontal policy area encompassing more than 
merely an environmental dimension, the EU’s policy-making with regard to negotiations in 
the CSD is also considered as ‘external environmental policy-making’. Indeed, EU policy-
making on CSD negotiations takes place within the same institutional context as other 
external environmental policies (i.e. in the Working Party on International Environmental 
Issues of the Council). 
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skills or expertise they possess or because they want to be closely involved in the 
negotiations. Fourth, the practice of informally dividing the labour in the EU’s 
policy-making process was initiated because of a pressing problem the EU was 
facing during international negotiations (such as a weakly performing Presidency 
or a situation in which the EU fears to be completely overwhelmed by the 
international negotiation partners). Thereafter, it has quickly become an 
uncontested informally institutionalized practice to prepare and conduct 
international environmental negotiations in that way. 
 
The fact that policy-making in the EU is often driven by informal dynamics is not 
a new observation. Scholars have emphasized the day-to-day informal 
interinstitutional interactions in the EU, stressing, for example, the Commission’s 
perspective (Stacey 2003), comitology (Joerges and Neyer 1997) or the role of the 
European Parliament (Maurer et al. 2005). Moreover, decision-making in the 
Council, which is the institution in which the informal division of labour 
discussed in this paper takes place, is often determined by informal norms, 
making the Council functioning in a less intergovernmental and formal way than 
one would expect at first sight (Heisenberg 2005; Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008). 
From that point of view, the informal nature of the division of labour in the 
context of the EU’s external environmental policy-making can be seen as another 
illustration of the normative character of the Council (Lewis 2003), at least in 
rather low-politics affairs. 
As for the EU’s external relations, informal practices and the non-Treaty based 
division of labour have mainly been studied with regard to the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). On the one hand, large member states taking 
the lead and de facto excluding the others from the EU’s foreign policy have been 
extensively analyzed in the literature on the so-called ‘directoires’ or ‘directorates’ 
(Keukeleire 2001; Gegout 2002). On the other hand, the more recent 
phenomenon of ‘core groups’ in the CFSP approximates more to the type of 
informal division of labour we witness in the EU’s external environmental policy, 
as the main rationale behind establishing such core groups is specialization and 
division of labour among member states (Schwegmann 2000; Keukeleire 2006). 
The informal practices of division of labour in the EU’s external environmental 
policy-making have been largely underexposed in the literature. Although it is 
part of the EU’s day-to-day policy-making practice in such an increasingly 
important domain, until now, only its occurrence has been highlighted (on the 
existence of lead countries in CSD, see Cameron 2004: 162; or Van den Brande 
2009a: 20-22; on the existence of lead negotiators and issue leaders in climate 
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negotiations, see Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008: 38; or van Schaik 2010: 262).2 
However, until now, no studies have aimed to unravel the dynamics of those 
processes in detail. 
 
This paper aims to fill that gap in the literature. Therefore, it seeks to answer the 
following research questions. First, what is the rationale behind the choice for an 
informal division of labour (section 2)? By answering that question the benefits of 
the system are likely to pop up. Second, how does the system function in practice, 
more in particular in EU’s policy-making regarding CSD (section 3), and climate 
change negotiations (section 4)? Third, what are the opportunities and possible 
caveats it generates (section 5)? And finally, what are the similarities and 
dissimilarities between both cases, and what we can learn from it in order to 
better understand the EU’s external environmental relations (the concluding 
section 6)? 
As mentioned, two cases are studied in this paper. First, we investigate the EU 
policy-making process with regard to CSD-16 and CSD-17 (2008-2009). Second, the 
EU’s participation in the two-year run-up to the 15th Conference of the Parties 
(COP 15) in Copenhagen is considered, hence also concentrating on the period 
2008-2009. In both cases, we focus on the day-to-day policy-making processes at 
the level of experts and government officials. EU policy-making and 
representation at the high-level sessions of international negotiations are not 
taken into account, since those do not follow the informal pattern of division of 
labour we aim to analyze. Although the level of politicization of both cases 
significantly differs, with the climate negotiations being more politicized than the 
CSD ones, the informal dynamics in the Council correspond. As we will elaborate 
in the concluding section, we argue that the level of politicization does not affect 
the extent to which the EU’s day-to-day external environmental policy-making 
process is characterized by an informal division of labour. The empirical data for 
this paper mainly originates from interviews we conducted with policy-makers 
who were closely involved in the EU processes.3 Moreover, we had the 
opportunity to attend international negotiations in the CSD and under UNFCCC, 
                                                
2 Moreover, a lead country system, similar to the one used in CSD negotiations, has also been 
applied during the final negotiation stages leading to the Stockholm Convention (Delreux 
2009: 25-26) and such a system is nowadays also used in the EU’s policy-making on 
international biodiversity negotiations. 
3 More in particular, we interviewed ten member state representatives, three Commission 
officials and two officials working at the Council Secretariat. Six of these interviewees have 
performed a lead country, lead negotiator or issue leader task in the CSD or climate 
negotiations between 2008 and 2009. The interviews were conducted in Brussels between 
May 2009 and March 2010. The interviews were qualitative and semi-structured, focusing on 
the practical functioning of lead countries, lead negotiators and issue leaders, as well as on 
the interviewees’ assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the system and the 
internal dynamics in the EU when this system of informal division of labour is employed. 
 6 
as well as WPIEI (Working Party on International Environmental Issues) 
meetings preparing for CSD negotiations, as a result of which a non-participatory 
observation in our field of study helped us to contextualize our findings. 
2. Rationale behind the informal division of labour 
Why do the actors in the EU – both the Presidency giving up power and the 
member states taking up additional work – opt for this informal system of division 
of labour? The rationale behind the establishment of this system seems to be 
fourfold: burden-sharing, expertise pooling, involving member states, and 
guaranteeing continuity. 
 
First, the international agenda of many international environmental negotiations 
is so dense that it becomes very difficult for a Presidency to appropriately manage 
the whole range of agenda items. Presidencies usually do not have sufficient 
capabilities to deal with the multitude, diversity and complexity of the 
international agenda. The two-year CSD-16/17 cycle covered a wide variety of 
themes, including agriculture, desertification and water. Likewise, the 
international climate change agenda is very broad and complex, comprising 
financial questions, forestry issues, mitigation discussions, etc. The preparation, 
coordination and administration of all those – often technical – items is an almost 
impossible task for a single Presidency. Hence, from the perspective of the 
Presidency, the CSD system of lead countries and the climate change system of 
lead negotiators and issue leaders can be seen as an effective burden-sharing 
exercise. The workload is informally separated among the other actors in the EU, 
who operate under the authority, auspices and responsibility of the Presidency. 
That first rationale certainly holds true for small and medium-sized Presidencies, 
but practice teaches us that large member states holding the Presidency, which 
could reasonably be assumed to have the necessary capabilities to deal with such 
a complex and broad agenda, also opt to continue with that system. That 
suggests that the rationale behind it is broader than only burden-sharing. 
 
Second, the system allows the EU to pool the expertise, know-how and 
negotiation skills of the 27 member states and the Commission. In other words, 
informally dividing the work is considered to strengthen the negotiation capacity 
of the EU at the international level, as it allows for assembling the best capacities 
in the EU instead of merely relying on the expertise the Presidency has. On the 
one hand, certain member states are known for their particular capabilities on a 
specific issue (such as the southern member states on desertification for CSD, or 
the Scandinavian countries on sinks in climate change negotiations). On the 
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other hand, not only member states have specific expertise, also individual 
representatives do. The informal division of labour makes it possible to also 
incorporate the skills and know-how of individual officials in the EU policy-making 
process, irrespective their national or institutional affiliation. 
 
Third, involving the member states in preparing (and conducting) the 
negotiations results in a win-win-situation both for the Presidency and for the 
member states that take the lead. On the one hand, it increases the likelihood of 
efficient decision-making, since the most interested member states have the 
opportunity to be involved in the process from its preparation stage, as a result of 
which they cannot be confronted with surprises when the decision-making 
process reaches the level of the entire Council (Working Group). Moreover, 
involving the member states in the international negotiations increases the 
likelihood of making the outcome of the international negotiations acceptable for 
the member states. By being active at the international level, the member states 
are able to properly assess the political borders within which an international 
agreement is possible, as well as the feasibility of the EU’s position, on which the 
formal EU negotiator (the Presidency) will likely have to make concessions 
(Delreux and Kerremans 2010). On the other hand, compared to a situation 
where only the Presidency is in charge, this system is beneficial for the member 
states as well, since they are able to significantly contribute to (a part of) the 
policy-making process, to experience ownership on a particular issue, and to feel 
useful in the EU. The drawback of a single Presidency doing all the work on its 
own is that the other member states cannot deploy their capabilities. Without a 
system of informal division of labour, a member state would have to wait 13 years 
(i.e. 26 Presidencies) before it could take the lead again in preparing EU positions 
or representing the EU internationally. 
 
Fourth, the system of informal division of labour improves the continuity in 
preparing the EU position internally and articulating that position externally. 
When everything is merely dealt with by the rotating Presidency – and the 
concomitant switch in staff –, continuity is at risk every six months. Other EU 
actors informally taking the lead for a longer period resolves this difficulty. 
Continuity is advantageous, first, for the preparation of EU positions, since 
international environmental negotiations are seldom finite. Indeed, climate 
change negotiations are a nonstop process going from COP to COP, each of them 
being prepared in multiple preparatory meetings. CSD processes usually take two 
years (a review year followed by a policy year). Hence, also there, lead countries 
guarantee the continuity that four successive Presidencies could never achieve. 
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Second, continuity is also advantageous in the EU’s external representation in 
climate change negotiations. Being represented by the same people not only 
facilitates the identification of the EU’s contact point by the international 
partners, it also implies the possibility of growing confidence between the EU 
negotiator and its colleagues from third states or negotiation blocs. 
3. Lead countries in the case of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development 
In the EU’s internal decision-making with regard to the CSD negotiations, a 
central role is put aside for the Presidency that has the responsibility of leading 
the Council towards a common EU position for each of the CSD issues on the 
agenda. Because of the reasons mentioned before, various Presidencies have 
opted for an informal division of labour when preparing the CSD negotiations. 
More in particular, the member states or even the Commission are assigned 
specific tasks during the preparatory process, as they take the lead in preparing 
the common EU position for a particular CSD issue. The role of the member states 
as lead countries does not include representing the EU at the international level. 
Indeed, the EU’s representation at CSD (or one of its preparatory meetings) is still 
exercised by the Presidency and in some cases by the Commission (cf infra).  
The origin of the lead country system seems to date back to the beginning of the 
nineties. At that time, in the context of post-Rio negotiations, many member 
states prepared their own draft EU position paper in an uncoordinated way, 
hampering the Presidency to integrate all those national texts into one common 
EU position. It was the Belgian Presidency of 1993 that suggested using a system 
of lead countries. The agenda of those post-Rio negotiations was extensive, 
highly technical and it demanded a lot of expertise. By using a system with lead 
countries, the available expertise among the member states could be pooled and 
the common performance of the EU would be increased. About at the same time, 
the system spilled over to the very recent CSD preparations. That spillover effect 
can be explained by the fact that the post-Rio negotiations and the negotiations 
on CSD issues were handled by mostly the same people. In other words, the EU 
preparations on CSD were influenced by the way the post-Rio preparations were 
managed, because the officials who were involved in both processes had good 
experiences with the lead country system in the post-Rio negotiations and chose 
to copy it to the CSD context. This logic of institutional isomorphism (Koelble 
1995) was promoted by the 1994 German Presidency that was convinced of the 
merits of delegating responsibilities to lead countries (usually the most active 
member states). 
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Although it is not totally clear whether the lead country system has been used by 
each Presidency from 1994 on, all Presidencies have been using the system for 
the CSD preparations of the current programme of work of CSD (2004-2017), i.e. 
from CSD-12 on. The agenda of the CSD has been planned on the basis of cycles 
of two years, in which each cycle consists of a so-called ‘review session’ in the first 
year and a so-called ‘policy session’ in the second year. Every cycle focuses on a 
specific thematic cluster of issues, on the one hand, and on a cluster of twelve 
cross-cutting issues (e.g. education, poverty eradication…), on the other hand 
(UNDESA 2008). For this paper, we examined the implementation cycle of CSD-16 
(2008) and CSD-17 (2009) that discussed six thematic issues, i.e. agriculture, rural 
development, land, drought, desertification and Africa, as well as the cluster of 
cross-cutting issues. While both sessions took place in New York during two 
weeks in May, the first session has been preceded by a Regional Implementation 
Meeting (RIM) for each UN region4 and the second session has been prepared by 
an Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting (IPM) for all UN member states in 
February 2009 in New York (Van den Brande 2009a: 8-12). 
The internal EU preparations of the CSD (and its preparatory meetings) and the 
external representation of the EU’s position are formally the main responsibility 
of the Presidency. The EU Presidencies that guided the member states through 
the preparatory process for the CSD-16/17 cycle were respectively Portugal, 
Slovenia, France and the Czech Republic. The internal EU decision-making 
process takes place in the Council Working Party on International Environmental 
Issues (WPIEI), in particular the WPIEI dealing with global environmental aspects 
of sustainable development (WPIEI Global). The WPIEI Global gathers monthly 
and the yearly session of the CSD is a recurring point on its agenda. It is the 
highest decision-making body that is involved in the preparatory decision-making 
process for CSD. Indeed, in contrast to other global negotiations, such as those on 
UNFCCC (Schunz et al. 2009: 5), the WPIEI Global does not prepare Environment 
Council conclusions on CSD. Once the WPIEI Global has adopted an EU position, 
that position is no longer discussed at higher levels by Coreper, the Environment 
Council5 or the European Council (Van den Brande 2009b: 12). On the spot, the 
EU coordination meetings are organized in a setting similar to that of the WPIEI 
Global. Those meetings take place daily before the CSD meeting itself or during 
the meeting, if deemed necessary. At those coordination meetings, the EU 
speaking points are finalized and practical arrangements important for the 
                                                
4 The EU participated at the RIM organized by the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) in January 2008 in Geneva.  
5 The role of the Environment Council (and of other Council configurations) with regard to 
CSD is very limited. In practice, it is only used for debriefing about the CSD negotiations by 
the Presidency.  
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negotiations of that day are made. The Presidency also uses those meetings for 
debriefing about the CSD discussions of the previous day and about its outreach 
activities.  
 
After having discussed where the preparations for the CSD exactly take place in 
the EU, we can now go deeper into the lead country system itself. In order to 
distribute the work among the member states, the Presidency clusters the 
thematic issues of the cycle in so-called ‘sub-clusters’. The sub-clusters are decided 
at the beginning of the preparations of the CSD cycle (in this case by the 
Portuguese Presidency) and usually not changed by the following Presidencies. 
For CSD-16/17, five sub-clusters were set up.6 The preparations for CSD-17 did not 
change the sub-clusters. Subsequently, a lead country is appointed for each sub-
cluster. Lead country tasks are carried out by representatives of member states or 
the Commission, who attend the WPIEI Global and who are responsible for the 
coordination of the EU position on the specific thematic issues of the sub-cluster. 
An important element in this regard is the division of competences between the 
member states and the EU. Thematic issues that are Union competences (e.g. 
agriculture in CSD-16/17) are almost automatically assigned to the Commission. 
The latter then takes up the role of lead country and operates under that 
heading. Although some Commission officials do not like to see the Commission 
called a lead ‘country’, it seems to be a general rule that the Commission takes 
the lead for issues covered by EU competences and that the other issues are 
divided among the member states. The occurrence of EU competences is thus a 
sufficient condition for the Commission to claim (and to be granted) its role as 
lead country. 
A lead country can be appointed for only one CSD session or for the whole cycle. 
In theory, the lead country system is used to achieve long term continuity across 
four Presidencies, which implies that a lead country is responsible for a sub-
cluster during the whole CSD cycle. The European Commission and Belgium, for 
example, were lead country during the whole CSD-16/17 cycle. In practice, 
however, it happens that member states stop being a lead country during the 
preparations, for example, because of organizational reasons. That was the case 
for the Czech Republic and Italy because of respectively its upcoming role as EU 
Presidency and as G8 Presidency. The process leading up to the appointment of 
the lead countries seems to be very informal and the result of a certain kind of 
lobbying between the member states and the Presidency. On the one hand, a 
                                                
6 Those were (1) a sub-cluster on agriculture, land and rural development; (2) a sub-cluster on 
drought and desertification; (3) a sub-cluster on Africa; (4) a sub-cluster on cross-cutting issues 
and interlinkages; and (5) a sub-cluster on water (for the review of the CSD-13 water and 
sanitation decisions). 
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member state can be eager to be a lead country with regard to a specific sub-
cluster. In that case, that member state starts an informal lobbying process 
towards the Presidency and the other member states. On the other hand, it can 
be the case that no member state is candidate to be a lead country for a specific 
sub-cluster. In such a case, the Presidency has to lobby in order to find a lead. 
Sometimes, when no member state is willing to take the lead for a specific sub-
cluster, the Presidency itself takes on the task (e.g. France on Africa, during its 
Presidency and until the end of the preparations). In general, the Presidency calls 
upon the previous lead countries at the first meeting of the WPIEI Global to 
express their continued intention to be a lead country or not. When the lead 
countries for each sub-cluster are appointed, all member states are informed by 
the Presidency in the WPIEI Global. Table 1 illustrates the thematic issues, the 
sub-clusters, the competence division and the lead countries with regard to the 
CSD-16/17 cycle. 
 
Thematic issue Sub-cluster Competence Lead country CSD-16 Lead country CSD-17 
Agriculture 1 EU Commission Commission 
Rural 
Development 
1 EU Commission Commission 
Land 1 MS The Netherlands France, Czech 
Republic (both as 
Presidency) 
Drought 2 MS Czech Republic & Italy Spain 
Desertification 2 MS Czech Republic & Italy Spain 
Africa 3 MS The Netherlands France (initially as 
Presidency) 
Cross-cutting 
issues & 
interlinkages7 
4 MS Belgium Belgium 
Water 5 MS France France 
Table 1: Lead countries for CSD-16 and CSD-17 
 
How does internal decision-making occur, taking into account the lead country system? 
The main function of a lead country is thus to help the Presidency in preparing 
the EU position on the issues of its sub-cluster. Following the informal character 
of the lead country system, each lead country is free to choose how it works and 
Presidencies do not interfere in a lead country’s working method. Yet, some 
consistency exists between the working methods of the various lead countries. 
An important example is the establishment of a subgroup by a lead country. Such 
a subgroup is an informal working group, consisting of a small number of member 
states that are interested in assisting and working together with the lead country 
on the issues of the sub-cluster. Although not all lead countries decide to 
establish a subgroup, most of them did during the CSD-16/17 preparations. Figure 
                                                
7 In the final months of the negotiations, ‘means of implementation’ was added to the thematic 
issue ‘cross-cutting issues and interlinkages’ and was led by Belgium, together with the UK 
and the Presidency. 
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1 illustrates the internal EU decision-making and the external EU representation 
with regard to CSD.  
 
EU decision-making EU representation
Environment Council
Coreper I
WPIEI Global
lead
country2:
MS
sub-b-
group2
lead
country...:
MS
sub-b-
group...
lead
countryn:
MS
sub-b-
groupn
lead
country1:
ECOM
sub-b-
group1
Presidency CommissionLC
LC
LC
LC LC
LC LC
LC
 
Figure 1: lead countries in EU policy-making with regard to CSD [LC = lead country; MS = 
member state; ECOM = Commission] 
 
In practice, the functioning of a lead country in the internal preparations for CSD 
is an iterative two-stage-process. It starts with the lead country writing a first 
draft of the text (e.g. position papers, speaking points…) and sending that to the 
members of its subgroup for comments. Subsequently, the lead country 
incorporates those comments and it prepares a revised draft which it sends to the 
Presidency. The latter may incorporate its own comments. That is the first stage, 
taking place between the lead country and its subgroup. Afterwards the 
Presidency circulates the draft to all member states, asking for written comments. 
At the next WPIEI Global the lead country presents the text to the other member 
states and the (written and oral) comments of the member states are discussed. 
That is the second stage, taking place among all member states in the WPIEI 
Global context. After the WPIEI Global has taken place, those two stages are 
repeated, giving the process an iterative character. Indeed, the lead country 
(together with its sub-group and in close cooperation with the Presidency) 
rewrites the draft text again, based on the received comments (stage 1). That 
new draft is then again discussed in the WPIEI Global (stage 2). At that time, the 
process of commenting and rewriting repeats itself until the WPIEI Global (or its 
equivalent on the spot) can adopt a final text. Draft documents can also be sent 
for approval to the member states by e-mail. In that case, the Presidency appeals 
to the ‘silent procedure’. Member states are given the opportunity to comment on 
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the documents before a given deadline. If comments are not sent in before the 
deadline, the Presidency assumes member states agree with the document 
(Rasch 2008: 66-67). 
Some Presidencies have tried to slightly structure the preparatory process, 
including the functioning of the lead countries, by suggesting a certain working 
method, a so-called ‘road map’, at the beginning of their Presidency. The French 
Presidency, for example, decided to work with ‘tool boxes’. That implied that each 
lead country needed to work out a couple of by the Presidency determined 
questions about, for example, the main political message and the ceilings and 
bottom lines of the EU. Under the Czech Presidency, those tool boxes formed the 
basis for the development of the EU speaking points for the Intergovernmental 
Preparatory Meeting.  
The system of lead countries seems to be working very well for helping the 
Presidency in preparing the EU common position. At the CSD, lead countries, 
however, do not take the role of EU spokesperson. This is a task of the 
Presidency, and to a lesser extent of the Commission. For all issues that are 
member state competences, which are the majority of CSD issues, the Presidency 
speaks for the EU. Yet, when Union competences are discussed, the Commission 
(also being a lead country in the internal preparations) takes the floor. For CSD-16 
and CSD-17, that was the case for all discussions and negotiations with regard to 
agriculture and rural development. In that regard, it is important to mention that 
the Commission enjoys a full participant status in the CSD (Rasch 2008: 106). As 
for the lead countries, they assist the Presidency when the latter takes the floor 
at the international level. They provide input to the Presidency, which can be 
immediately used during the course of the international negotiations. Sitting next 
to the Presidency, they intensively follow the discussions and coordinate on the 
spot. Moreover, in practice, it has happened that the Presidency passes the floor 
to a lead country to represent the EU on a particular topic, but that practice 
largely depends on the capacities and the will of the Presidency. 
4. Lead negotiators and issue leaders in the case of climate 
negotiations 
Although the division of competences, and in particular the EU’s new climate 
change legislation, may suggest a large formal role for the Commission in the 
EU’s representation in international climate change negotiations, the Council still 
is the prominent body for external climate policy-making (van Schaik 2010). 
Consequently, the main responsibility, both for ensuring external representation 
and for adopting EU positions, lies with the Presidency (Lacasta et al. 2007). 
However, because of the reasons mentioned above, a system of informal division 
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of labour under the Presidency’s auspices has been established, giving the 
member states and the Commission a larger role in the policy-making process 
than suggested by the formal framework. 
The current system of informal division of labour, with so-called ‘lead negotiators’ 
and ‘issue leaders’, has been introduced during the 2004 Irish EU Presidency 
(Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008). Before, the Presidency carried out the tasks, 
which are now informally assigned to lead negotiators and issue leaders. The 
Irish Presidency opted to change that practice because of a twofold reason. On 
the one hand, it considered itself as not having sufficient capacity to deal with 
the climate change dossier. On the other hand, it did not want to make the same 
mistakes as its predecessor, the Italian Presidency, which is said to have 
performed rather weakly on climate change. That seems to have worked as the 
necessary catalyst to adopt the system of lead countries and issue leaders. 
In this informal system of division of labour, the burden that is shared is twofold: 
representation (to the lead negotiators) and direct support for the negotiator (to 
the issue leaders). Lead negotiators are well-experienced negotiators who 
represent the EU at the international level for a certain agenda item during a 
longer period. In other words, the lead negotiators express the EU’s single voice at 
the international level. That mainly holds true for the international negotiations 
in the main day-to-day negotiation settings or so-called ‘contact groups’ or 
‘drafting groups’. The EU’s statements in the plenary meetings of the COP or the 
CMP8 are still made by the Presidency. The lead negotiators are supported by a 
group of issue leaders, being experts whose main task is not to represent the EU 
internationally but to assist the lead negotiator on the spot. Similar to the lead 
countries in the CSD case, lead negotiators and the team of issue leaders in 
climate change negotiations function under the formal umbrella and authority of 
the Presidency. As the national or institutional affiliation of lead negotiators and 
issue leaders does not matter, they are de facto representatives from whatever 
member state or from the Commission. 
Since 2004, the application of the system has evolved in accordance with the 
developments at the international level. Between 2004 and 2007, each agenda 
item of the various institutional bodies working under UNFCCC9 was negotiated 
by a lead negotiator on behalf of the EU. Some agenda items that were logically 
connected, were clustered and jointly assigned to a single lead negotiator. In that 
period, more than 25 different lead negotiators were deployed, each representing 
                                                
8 The COP is the main meeting of the Parties to UNFCCC, whereas the CMP (Conference of the 
Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) is the main meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
9 These institutional bodies are mainly the COP, the CMP, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). 
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the EU for a particular (set of) agenda items. The number of lead negotiators has 
been drastically reduced since UNFCCC’s COP 13 in Bali (December 2007), where 
climate change negotiations have been accommodated under two negotiation 
tracks. Indeed, the Bali Road Map introduced a two-track approach meant to reach 
an overall climate change agreement in Copenhagen in 2009 (Kulovesi and 
Gutiérrez 2009). The first track is negotiated with all UNFCCC parties in the 
institutional framework of the AWG-LCA (Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention), whereas the second track implies 
negotiations among the Kyoto Protocol parties in the institutional setting of the 
AWG-KP (Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol). These two AWGs met eight times in 2008-2009 and 
they served as the main negotiation settings during the first week and a half at 
COP 15 in Copenhagen. In the period studied in this paper (2008-2009), the EU 
negotiation arrangement was adapted to those two-track negotiations, since the 
EU was represented in each AWG by a separate lead negotiator, each being 
surrounded by a group of issue leaders. 
The assignment of these informal lead negotiator and issue leader tasks to 
various actors in the EU is similar to the assignment of lead countries in decision-
making with regard to CSD, as it is based on informal consultations on the one 
hand and formal Presidency responsibility on the other hand. Before each 
meeting of the AWGs, the Presidency tables a list comprising the lead negotiators 
and the issue leaders. This takes place at a WPIEI Climate Change (WPIEI CC) 
meeting, which convenes in a ‘heads only’ configuration. Indeed, in EU climate 
change policy-making, the informal division of labour is decided upon only by the 
heads of the 27 national delegations. Since one of the main rationales behind the 
use of the informal system is to guarantee continuity among multiple 
Presidencies, it comes at no surprise that most of the lead negotiators and issue 
leaders maintain their informal function during multiple negotiation sessions. 
However, there are always people who cannot continue their function as lead 
negotiator or issue leader (mainly due to job changes), as a result of which each 
Presidency de facto has to find new candidates for fulfilling the tasks. Practice 
shows that Presidencies mostly take up the table with names from the previous 
negotiation session and that they informally consult with the member states on 
possible new candidates for the vacant positions of issue leaders or lead 
negotiators. Briefly, the choice of lead negotiators and issue leaders in climate 
change policy-making follows a very informal path in which member state 
representatives are cautiously approached by the Presidency, but also vice-versa. 
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To understand the role and the functioning of lead negotiators and issue leaders 
in international climate change negotiations, the internal decision-making 
process in the Council should be examined. Indeed, the institutional structure for 
decision-making in the Council and the informal system for EU representation – 
with lead negotiators and issue leaders – are closely connected. The WPIEI CC 
occupies the central place in the Council decision-making structure. On the one 
hand, before the international negotiations, it serves as the main preparatory 
body for respectively Coreper and the Environment Council, which adopts Council 
Conclusions determining the general EU position on climate change. Indeed, 
unlike for CSD, EU positions on climate change are decided at ministerial level. 
Moreover, also the ECOFIN Council and even the European Council have been 
involved in the decision-making process the last years. The former decides upon 
the EU position regarding the financial aspects of the climate change 
negotiations, while the latter has come into the picture to cut the final – and 
politically most sensitive – knots in case the sectoral Councils do not manage to 
find an agreement. On the other hand, during the international negotiations, the 
WPIEI CC is the principal body in which EU positions are defined, strategies 
discussed and position papers adapted to the need of the international 
negotiations. Indeed, the EU coordination meetings, which are organized mostly 
twice a day during the weeks of the international negotiations, take place in a 
WPIEI CC setting. 
However, in order to deal with the complexity and multitude of issues on the 
international agenda, an additional decision-making structure is set up below the 
WPIEI CC level. Indeed, the traditional political (Environment Council and 
European Council), ambassadorial (Coreper) and administrative (WPIEI CC) levels 
are supplemented by an extra expert-level decision-making structure, which 
consists of ‘expert groups’. Similar to the WPIEI CC, those expert groups are 
composed of member state and Commission officials. However, since not every 
member state has a sufficient level of capacity and staff, not all expert groups are 
attended by every single member state. In the two-year run-up to the 
Copenhagen conference, eleven expert groups were operating. Ten of those 
expert groups have a thematic focus, since they deal with a specific topic, such as 
technology, mechanisms or legal issues.10 Their main function is the preparation 
of EU position papers and background documents on the various topics. The 
eleventh expert group, EGFA (Expert Group on Future Action), was initially 
conceived as the expert group dealing with mitigation issues, but has evolved 
                                                
10 The ten thematic expert groups are EGAD (Expert Group on Adaptation), DCEG (Developing 
Countries Expert Group), TECH (Technology), EGIF (Expert Group on Investment and 
Financial Flows), LULUCF (Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry), REP (Reporting), LEX 
(Legal Issues), SCI (Science), BUDGET, and MEX (Mechanisms). 
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towards the coordinating body of the ten other thematic expert groups. In theory, 
EGFA’s task is to aggregate the work prepared by the other expert groups and to 
transfer that to the WPIEI CC, which can then hold a political discussion on the 
basis of the expert groups’ output. Policy-makers admit, however, that in practice, 
the distinction between EGFA’s and the WPIEI CC’s job is unclear and that both 
sometimes duplicate each other’s work. 
 
How are those EU positions now transmitted to and expressed at the 
international level? That is where the lead negotiators and the issue leaders come 
into the story. In the two-year run-up to Copenhagen, the two main lead 
negotiators, one negotiating the Convention track in the AWG-LCA and the other 
representing the EU for the Kyoto Protocol track in the AWG-KP, were senior, 
highly ranked officials coming from the WPIEI CC. The lead negotiator for AWG-
LCA was a Dutch representative, while the AWG-KP lead negotiator came from 
the Commission. Indeed, not only member states are involved in this informal 
division of labour, the Commission is as well. In terms of the lead negotiator (and 
also issue leader) tasks it fulfils under the Presidency’s umbrella, the Commission 
de facto acts like a (large) 28th member state. Its negotiation role has little to do 
with the division of competences between the EU and the member states. Apart 
from those two lead negotiators for the two AWGs, a third lead negotiator (from 
the UK) spoke on behalf of the EU for all forestry-related issues (LULUCF, REDD, 
etc.)11 in both AWG’s. Moreover, because of frequent parallel negotiations in the 
AWG-LCA, the function of deputy lead negotiator for the Convention track was 
created. That deputy lead negotiator (from the UK) represented the EU when the 
main LCA lead negotiator was involved in parallel AWG-LCA negotiations. 
Besides negotiating on behalf of the EU in climate negotiations in the 
institutional framework of UNFCCC, and more in particular in their respective 
AWG, the lead negotiators are also involved in representing the EU in other 
multilateral fora where climate change is discussed, such as the G20, the Major 
Economies Forum or the Greenland Dialogue. 
Besides the representation, a second task is informally distributed among member 
state and Commission officials. That is the task of the issue leader who is 
assisting the lead negotiator during the international negotiation sessions. Those 
issue leaders are the right hands of the lead negotiator when the latter is 
representing the EU in the AWGs. They perform the practical background work 
for the lead negotiator, such as keeping up-to-date tables with positions and 
proposals from the external negotiation partners, the corresponding EU position 
                                                
11 LULUCF is short for Land Use Land-Use Change and Forestry; and REDD for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation.  
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and rationale. When negotiations have come to a drafting stage, they examine 
the drafts lying at the international negotiation table and they suggest 
amendments the lead negotiator can propose to bring the draft closer to the EU 
position. That is done on the basis of the existing EU position papers adopted by 
the WPIEI CC and on the basis of the Council conclusions. Briefly, by converting 
EU position papers into practical input to be used by the lead negotiator, the issue 
leaders constitute the link between the EU’s system of representation (by the 
lead negotiators) and its system of decision-making and preference aggregation 
(by the expert groups and the WPIEI CC). Their ability to link the EU 
representation with the determination of the EU position relies on the fact that 
they combine a central position in both systems. On the one hand, they attend 
the international negotiations sitting behind or alongside the lead negotiator. On 
the other hand, all issue leaders are member of EGFA, the expert group that 
coordinates and collects the work of the thematic expert groups. Figure 2 shows 
the link between the decision-making system and the representation system, 
emphasizing the central role of lead negotiators and issue leaders in the day-to-
day international climate negotiations. 
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Figure 2: lead negotiators and issue leaders in the EU’s external climate change policy-making 
[EG = expert group] 
 
Whereas the expert groups prepare EU position papers for both tracks of the 
climate negotiations, the issue leaders work in two separate teams: one team 
working on the LCA-track, the other on the KP-track. Both teams comprised 
approximately ten issue leaders, each of them having a particular substantive 
focal point. These focal points mirror the various contact groups at the 
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international level. Indeed, all international negotiation partners in the AWG-LCA 
and the AWG-KP meet in different so-called ‘contact groups’, each of them 
dedicated to a particular issue discussed in that negotiation track. Examples of the 
LCA-track include the contact groups on shared vision, spillover effects or REDD. 
In the KP-track, contact groups focus e.g. on numbers, mechanisms or LULUCF. 
The focal points of the various issue leaders echo those contact groups. 
Consequently, there is, for example, an issue leader focusing on shared vision in 
the LCA-track. Practice shows that in all contact groups within each track, the EU 
is usually represented by the responsible lead negotiator. Only the issue leader(s) 
with the focal points corresponding to the focus of the contact group assist(s) the 
lead negotiator there. Hence, in different contact groups of the same AWG, the 
same lead negotiator relies on different right hands. 
5. Opportunities and caveats 
The informal division of labour between the Presidency, the member states and 
the Commission is applauded by many of the involved actors in the EU as it 
strengthens the EU as a player in international CSD and climate negotiations. 
However, the system not only implies opportunities, such as the ones we 
discussed in section 2, but possibly also caveats. Three of them deserve particular 
attention: the importance of personalities, the clarity in the EU’s external 
representation and the overview on the whole negotiation package.   
 
First, informally dividing the work in the EU is all about having the right person 
in the right place at the right time. Many of the qualities a lead country, an issue 
leader or a lead negotiator must have, can be deduced to the level of the 
individual. Both Commission and member states officials admit that the personal 
characteristics of the individual who fulfils the task are often crucial. Being a good 
lead country, for example, implies appointing that national expert with the 
necessary technical expertise and excellent drafting, coordination and 
communication skills. In addition, that expert needs to be cooperative and 
consensual in nature, taking into account the comments of other member states 
and working in a close relationship with the Presidency. Good issue leaders are 
said to need strong analytical skills and technical expertise, and they have to be 
good team players. The characteristics of a good lead negotiator, on the contrary, 
are strong negotiation skills – including its ability to approach the external 
negotiation partners –, solid language skills, and strategic insights. 
Yet, relying on the capabilities of one individual may have a backside as well. One 
of them concerns so-called ‘pet issues’ or ‘hobbyhorses’. Those are usually 
favourite topics of either a particular member state (because of its national 
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interest in the topic) or even of an official of a member state (because of its 
personal interest or technical expertise on the topic). If too much attention is paid 
to a pet issue in the EU, compared to the attention that issue gets at the 
international level, then that can result in redundant efforts. Moreover, although 
this phenomenon guarantees continuity, it may also hinder other interested 
member states to take the lead on that particular issue. Practice shows that the 
likelihood of facing this caveat is much higher in the CSD preparations than in 
the climate change policy-making process, since lead countries often individually 
take the lead, whereas issue leaders are embedded in a more collective effort. 
Another trap concerns the high turnover of experts involved in the negotiations 
on CSD and climate, because of persons changing jobs or retiring. However, 
decision-makers do not see that as an insurmountable problem. In CSD part of the 
problem is taken care of by working with sub-groups, since the members of those 
sub-groups are obvious candidates to take over the job of lead country. In the 
policy-making process on climate change, each issue leader has a second focal 
point, serving as a back-up for a colleague issue leader, whereas deputy lead 
negotiators are recently being appointed to solve this caveat for the EU 
representation. 
 
Second, when looking at the informal system of division of labour, one could 
imagine that an external negotiation partner of the EU gets confused about who 
exactly to approach as main contact point of the EU. Does the system not 
jeopardize the clarity in the EU’s external representation on the international 
scene? Like the first caveat that is linked to personalities, also this one seems to 
be more prominent in theory than in practice. In the context of the climate 
negotiations decision-makers emphasize that the clarity in the EU’s external 
representation is guaranteed by working with two lead negotiators. Indeed, lead 
negotiators exercise their role for a longer time period (than six months) 
participating at multiple preparatory meetings and COPs. That increases the 
clarity in the EU’s external representation because external negotiation partners 
already know who negotiates for the EU in a particular AWG. The question on the 
clarity in the EU’s external representation is even less prominent in the CSD 
context, since the lead country system is mainly ‘a backroom activity’ and the EU 
is externally represented by the Presidency or the Commission. 
 
Third, dividing the work among various lead countries or issue leaders and lead 
negotiators may at the end of the day result in losing the overview on the 
entirety of the negotiation agenda. Caveats that could arise are the isolation of 
the work conducted by the various lead countries or sub-groups (for CSD) or the 
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lack of coordination between the two lead negotiators (for the climate 
negotiations). However, that possible problem is mainly absorbed by the central 
place the Presidency keeps occupying in the policy-making process. Indeed, the 
Presidency holds the final responsibility over the whole negotiation package and 
it is its main task to ensure that the overview is maintained. First of all, it chairs 
the WPIEI meetings, where the final EU positions are adopted. Second, the 
Presidency overlooks the informally divided work by having a representative in 
each sub-group (CSD negotiations) and in each expert group as well as having 
issue leaders in each negotiation track (both in climate negotiations). Third, its 
input in the EU position mainly consists of avoiding overlaps and contradictions 
between various EU positions on separate issues. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the informal division of labour has some 
disadvantages, many of which result from the fact that the system is mainly 
personality-driven. In practice, however, many caveats are countered by the 
existing institutional provisions such as the role of the Presidency, the internal 
EU decision-making process with a central position for the WPIEI and the external 
representation of the EU. 
6. Conclusion 
The informal division of labour in the Council is key to understand the EU’s day-
to-day external environmental policy-making with regard to CSD and climate 
change negotiations. The lead country system for preparing CSD as well as the 
system with lead negotiators and issue leaders employed in EU policy-making 
regarding international climate change negotiations share a couple of common 
characteristics. First, as mentioned in the introduction, it is an informal system 
under the Presidency’s umbrella in which member states or the Commission are 
assigned a certain task on which they are assumed to have a particular skill. 
Second, as discussed in section 2, the rationale behind and the advantages of this 
system are similar in both cases: burden-sharing, expertise pooling, involving 
member states, and guaranteeing continuity. Third, the two case studies show 
that the selection and appointment of lead countries, lead negotiators and issue 
leaders follow a similar pattern. They are a combination of, on the one hand, the 
Presidency approaching aspirant member states and, on the other hand, 
interested member states informally lobbying the Presidency. Fourth, both 
instances of informal division of labour differ little with regard to the role of the 
Commission. If the Commission (or at least a Commission official) takes up the 
function of lead country, lead negotiator or issue leader, it carries out that 
function in a similar way as most member states (or member state 
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representatives) do. Hence, rather than the institutional background, the 
informally assigned task determines the policy-making behaviour of actors who 
take the lead in the EU. The competence question only seems to play a role in the 
selection process of lead countries for CSD, where it is common practice that the 
Commission takes the lead on topics with EU competences. Fifth, lead countries 
and issue leaders partly perform the same function in the EU’s representation, as 
they assist the EU’s spokesperson (the Presidency in CSD, the lead negotiators in 
climate negotiations). However, the lead countries’ main task is the preparation 
of the EU position papers, while that is mainly taken up by the expert groups in 
the climate case.  
However, there are also dissimilarities between the CSD and climate change 
system of informal division of labour. First and foremost, the nature of the 
assigned tasks differs. Whereas the preparation of the EU position is the main 
task of the lead countries in the CSD case, negotiating on behalf of the EU and 
supporting the EU negotiator are the main responsibilities of respectively the lead 
negotiator and the issue leaders in the climate change case. Second, the internal 
hierarchy in the national delegation is an important factor in understanding the 
informal division of labour on climate change negotiations, but this does not 
count for the CSD case. Whereas the function of lead negotiator is preserved for 
heads of delegation and issue leaders are usually rather junior experts, the 
function of lead country can be taken up irrespective the representative’s position 
in the member state’s hierarchy. Third, in the CSD case, the task of a lead country 
is assigned to a member state (although the impact of personalities may not be 
underestimated). On the contrary, in the climate case, issue leaders and lead 
negotiators are individuals and their national or institutional affiliation does not 
matter. 
 
Notwithstanding the dissimilarities sketched above, the similar dynamics and 
processes in both cases strengthen the external validity of our finding that EU’s 
external environmental policy-making is often characterized by an informal 
division of labour in the Council. It would be plausible to expect that the degree of 
politicization of the negotiations and the extent of informality in the policy-
making process are inversely interlinked. Nevertheless, since an equally informal 
system is also applied in climate change negotiations, which are more politicized 
and salient than CSD negotiations, it is apparently not the case that informal 
arrangements in the Council only occur in policy domains that are not politicized. 
However, it is important to note that the system of informal division of labour 
only seems to work up to a critical point of politicization. Once negotiations reach 
a political level and are attended by ministers, such as the high-level sessions of 
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CSD meetings or climate COPs, the informal system of lead countries, lead 
negotiators and issue leaders fades away and is replaced by its more formal 
alternative, i.e. the Presidency being in charge. Behind that critical point of 
politicization, the involved actors seem to relapse into formal rules. That also 
explains why the informal division of labour discussed in this paper often remains 
a concealed and hidden phenomenon for non-insiders. However, as we 
demonstrated, it may not be overlooked when one aims to understand the EU’s 
day-to-day external environmental policy-making and the way the EU behaves in 
international environmental negotiations. 
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